Why I Was Bullish Uranium Into 2026

Executive Summary#

Late-August 2026 Status Review#

The EIA’s revised 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report provides a useful cross-check rather than a new standalone call. US reactor operators paid a weighted-average $58.46/lb for 46.9 million pounds of 2025 deliveries, an 11% higher price on 16% lower volume than in 2024. At year-end, maximum contracted deliveries for 2026–2035 were 174 million pounds against 186 million pounds of unfilled requirements.

That procurement gap supports the multi-year contracting thesis, but the near-term picture is buffered: total US commercial inventories rose 9% to 170 million pounds, including 118 million pounds held by reactor owners. The evidence therefore does not support an immediate shortage claim or a higher-conviction promotion. The view remains bullish and open over 12–36 months, with inventory drawdown and disclosed term-contract activity more important than spot momentum alone.

Investment View#

Positioning#

Market Background#

Uranium is a small commodity market embedded in a much larger electricity system. Fuel is a relatively modest share of a nuclear plant’s total operating cost, while reliability and regulatory approval are critical. This can make utility demand less price-sensitive than demand in many industrial commodities.

At the same time, the market is not defined only by mined U3O8. Conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication can become bottlenecks, and geopolitical restrictions can alter the value of material at different stages of the cycle.

Investment Thesis#

1. Reactor Requirements Were Set to Rise#

The World Nuclear Association’s 2025 Nuclear Fuel Report estimated global reactor requirements of approximately 68,920 tonnes of uranium in 2025. Its reference scenario projected just over 150,000 tonnes by 2040, with an upper scenario above 204,000 tonnes.

The thesis did not require the upper case. Even the reference path implied a substantial increase in dependable annual supply.

2. The Contracting Gap Was Deferred, Not Immediate#

The original presentation claimed that roughly 70% of 2027–2028 utility needs were uncovered. US EIA data do not support that statement.

At the end of 2024, US reactor operators reported maximum contracted deliveries of 41.9 million pounds for 2027 against maximum anticipated requirements of 45.3 million pounds. For 2028, contracted deliveries were 30.2 million pounds against requirements of 41.8 million pounds. The unfilled share therefore rose sharply in 2028, but it was nowhere near 70% across both years.

The gap widened more materially later: unfilled requirements were 20.5 million pounds in 2030, 32.6 million in 2031 and 33.8 million in 2032.

This correction improves the analysis. The market did not face an immediate wall in 2026; it faced a progressively larger procurement requirement that could encourage earlier contracting.

3. Inventories Were a Buffer#

US commercial uranium inventories reached approximately 167 million pounds U3O8 equivalent at the end of 2024, up 6% year on year. Reactor-owner inventories rose to about 126 million pounds.

The original description of inventories as broadly depleted was therefore inaccurate for the United States.

Inventories still do not remove the long-term problem. They can delay purchases, smooth disruptions and reduce near-term price sensitivity, but drawing them down is not a permanent source of supply. Their existence means the timing of the bull case depends heavily on utility procurement behaviour.

4. Supply and Fuel-Cycle Capacity Were Concentrated#

Kazakhstan remained a dominant mine supplier, while Russia retained an important role in conversion and enrichment. The US prohibition on Russian low-enriched uranium imports, subject to temporary waivers, demonstrated how policy could fragment a previously global fuel cycle.

New mines, restarts and enrichment capacity require capital, permitting, technical expertise and time. Higher prices may ultimately solve the shortage by encouraging supply, but that response is slow.

5. Data-Centre Demand Strengthened the Nuclear Narrative#

Electricity demand from data centres increased interest in reliable, low-carbon baseload generation. Corporate agreements to support existing or restarted nuclear capacity improved the strategic case for reactor life extensions and new builds.

This was a useful demand catalyst, but the original work overstated the idea that technology companies were directly price-insensitive buyers of uranium. Most buy electricity, not uranium. The effect is indirect through reactor economics and capacity decisions.

Catalysts#

Principal Risks#

Outcome and Reflection#

Research Methodology#

The original thesis and reference range come from the 20 November 2025 Queen’s Tower Capital presentation. Reactor-demand projections were checked against the World Nuclear Association, while US contracts and inventories were checked against the EIA’s Uranium Marketing Annual Report. The late-August review uses the revised 2025 EIA release published on 13 August 2026.

Sources#

• World Nuclear Association — Nuclear Fuel Report 2025
• US EIA — Uranium Marketing Annual Report
• US EIA — Maximum Anticipated Uranium Requirements
• US EIA — Commercial Uranium Inventories
• US Department of Energy — Russian Uranium Import Guidance